New preimage attacks against reduced SHA-1

Abstract

This paper shows preimage attacks against reduced SHA-1 up to 57 steps. The best previous attack has been presented at CRYPTO 2009 and was for 48 steps finding a two-block preimage with incorrect padding at the cost of 2 159.3 evaluations of the compression function. For the same variant our attacks find a one-block preimage at 2 150.6 and a correctly padded two-block preimage at 2 151.1 evaluations of the compression function. The improved results come out of a differential view on the meet-in-the-middle technique originally developed by Aoki and Sasaki. The new framework closely relates meet-in-the-middle attacks to differential cryptanalysis which turns out to be particularly useful for hash functions with linear message expansion and weak diffusion properties. © 2012 International Association for Cryptologic Research.