Calhoun's early speeches and writings argue for an expansive national government. His later works, most notably A Disquisition on Government, argue for a strong version of states' rights, nullification, and secession. Earlier accounts of Calhoun's thought attribute this apparent contradiction to political expediency and opportunism. But I argue here that Calhoun's early nationalism was a reaction against the operation of multiple vetoes in the legislative process, requiring near unanimity to pass legislation. By 1825, however, Congress had evolved institutions that circumvented these vetoes, resulting in majoritarian redistribution. The later Calhoun opposed the legislation that followed from these circumventions and proposed an alternative form of unanimity, the concurring majority, as the appropriate corrective. © 1991 George Mason University.
CITATION STYLE
Aranson, P. H. (1991). Calhoun’s constitutional economics. Constitutional Political Economy, 2(1), 31–52. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393225
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