An agent-based approach on conditional deterrence

Abstract

This paper provides an integrated structure that defines conditions for the success and failure of deterrence. The conditional deterrence model presented can be applied to global and regional interactions that drive nuclear proliferation. The objective is to further extend the dyadic logic established to anticipate challenges generated by the proliferation of nuclear capabilities and their acquisitions by non-state dissatisfied agents. Key elements included in this assessment are relative capabilities, risk propensity associated with the status quo, and physical exposure to preemptive-attack or retaliation. This work uses ABM to generalize insights to deterrence environments with multiple competing actors. We show that deterrence is stable when the capabilities of a dissatisfied challenger are inferior to that of a dominant and satisfied defender. Deterrence is tenuous when a dissatisfied challenger approaches parity in capability with the dominant and satisfied defender, or when a violent non-state actor obtains nuclear weapon or other WMDs.