Hedonic games provide a general model of coalition formation, in which a set of agents is partitioned into coalitions, with each agent having preferences over which other players are in her coalition. We prove that with additively separable preferences, it is varSigma-complete to decide whether a core- or strict-core-stable partition exists, extending a result of Woeginger (2013). Our result holds even if valuations are symmetric and non-zero only for a constant number of other agents. We also establish var-completeness of deciding non-emptiness of the strict core for hedonic games with dichotomous preferences. Such results establish that the core is much less tractable than solution concepts such as individual stability.
CITATION STYLE
Peters, D. (2017). Precise Complexity of the Core in Dichotomous and Additive Hedonic Games. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 10576 LNAI, pp. 214–227). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67504-6_15
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