Fighting forms of expression

Abstract

Even though Key (2016) has done a very thorough job of assembling evidence showing that fish are unlikely to have the neurological capacity to be conscious and feel pain, there will still be a significant number of behavioural biologists who want to continue maintaining that fish do have consciousness and suffer from pain. In this commentary the reasons for people resisting the conclusions of the evidence are discussed. The reasons revolve around three aspects of the debate: the overblown respect humans have for the powers of consciousness in our day-to-day behaviour, the often used assumption that the possession of complex behaviour must mean that an animal is conscious, and by the misapplication of words such as 'pain.' Introduction. What is fascinating about the debate addressed by Key's (2016) target article is that the topic divides scientists into two distinct groups. Key represents those who consider that the important task is to examine the neurological evidence for the existence in fish of consciousness and the ability to feel pain. He has done an excellent job of assembling the evidence to show that it is very unlikely that fish do feel pain, but as the commentaries on his article will no doubt show, there will still be people who remain unconvinced and continue to maintain that fish are conscious and feel pain. I want to understand why this second group remains unconvinced, and my commentary explores potential reasons.