Generic driving behavior modeling by differential game theory

Abstract

In the last few decades, a number of driving models aiming at modeling the longitudinal and lateral driving tasks have been put forward based on the analogy with self-driven many particle systems. Examples of such models are the social-forces type models for car-following behavior [1], the IDM (Intelligent Driver Model) and its modifications [2], and the MOBIL model [3] describing lane-changing behavior. Although these models can describe many phenomena in motorway traffic flow operations, a clear behavioral foundation has however been lacking so far. This contribution puts forward a new generic theory of driving behavior, based on the principle of least effort. In this theory, drivers are assumed to minimize the predicted subjective perceived effort of their control actions, including for instance acceleration towards the free speed, car-following and lane changing. In this game-theoretic approach, drivers may or may not anticipate the reactions of the other drivers on their control decisions. Also non-cooperative and cooperative driving rules can be incorporated using the flexibility of the modeling approach. In this contribution, we present the main behavioral assumptions, the model derivation, and the resulting car-following and lane changing models for the non-cooperative case. The workings of the model will be illustrated by means of a simple example. © 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.