Three equilibrium strategies for two-person zero-sum game with fuzzy payoffs

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Abstract

In this paper, a two-person zero-sum game is considered, in which the payoffs are characterized as fuzzy variables. Based on possibility measure, credibility measure, and fuzzy expected value operator, three types of concept of minimax equilibrium strategies, r-possible minimax equilibrium strategy, r-credible minimax equilibrium strategy, and expected minimax equilibrium strategy, are defined. An iterative algorithm based on fuzzy simulation is designed to find the equilibrium strategies. Finally, a numerical example is provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the algorithm. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005.

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APA

Xu, L., Zhao, R., & Shu, T. (2006). Three equilibrium strategies for two-person zero-sum game with fuzzy payoffs. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 3613 LNAI, pp. 350–354). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11539506_44

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