Evolutionary, Mean-Field And Pressure-Resistance Game Modelling Of Networks Security

Abstract

The recently developed mean-field game models of corruption and bot-net defence in cyber-security, the evolutionary game approach to inspection and corruption, and the pressure-resistance game element, can be combined under an extended model of interaction of large number of indistinguishable small players against a major player, with focus on the study of security and crime prevention. In this paper we introduce such a general framework for complex interaction in network structures of many players, that incorporates individual decision making inside the environment (the mean-field game component), binary interaction (the evolutionary game component), and the interference of a principal player (the pressure-resistance game component). To perform concrete calculations with this overall complicated model, we suggest working, in sequence, in three basic asymptotic regimes; fast execution of personal decisions, small rates of binary interactions, and small payoff discounting in time.