We propose a log signing scheme that enables (a) verification of the integrity of the whole log, and (b) presentation of any record, along with a compact proof that the record has not been altered since the log was signed, without leaking any information about the contents of other records in the log. We give a formal security proof of the scheme, discuss practical considerations, and provide an implementation case study.
CITATION STYLE
Buldas, A., Truu, A., Laanoja, R., & Gerhards, R. (2014). Efficient record-level keyless signatures for audit logs. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 8788, pp. 149–164). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11599-3_9
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