Abstract
This chapter is concerned with basic concepts of solution for coalitional games with fuzzy coalitions in the case of finitely many players and transferable utility. The focus is on those solutions which preoccupy the main part of cooperative game theory (the core and the Shapley value). A detailed discussion or just the comprehensive overview of current trends in fuzzy games is beyond the reach of this chapter. Nevertheless, we mention current developments and briefly discuss other solution concepts.
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CITATION STYLE
Kroupa, T., & Milan, M. V. (2015). Basic solutions of fuzzy coalitional games. In Springer Handbook of Computational Intelligence (pp. 145–156). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-43505-2_9
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