An economic lab experiment for the best offer and approval in face-to-face service interaction situation

Abstract

This article investigates what types of social distance affect the best offer from an employee and its approval from a customer in general service situation. We conduct the deception game (Gneezy, 2005) and investigate the effects of the social distance (face-to-face vs. anonymous interaction) in a laboratory experimental economics method. We observed increases in the rate at which employees made best offers and the rates at which customers accepted offers when face-to-face interactions were conducted. But a statistically significant difference was not observed. Also, the level of trust in others reported by the subject playing the role of the employee had a statistically significant positive effect in cases in which the employee made a best offer. It was also observed that, regardless of whether the interaction was conducted face to face or anonymously, if the subject playing the role of the customer exhibited a low level of tolerance for falsehood, he or she was less likely to accept offers.