The Afghanistan Experience: Democratization by Force

Abstract

On Oct 7, 2001, the Bush administration launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to dislodge al Qaeda forces, neutralize the Taliban in Afghanistan, and decapitate their respective leadership. Following the fall of Kabul in November 2001, the American agenda for Afghanistan rapidly metamorphosed into a nation-building project. The Bush administration assumed that once freed from the shackles of the Taliban tyranny, the Afghan population would embrace the Western agenda of reconstruction and institutional development. It is evident the ambitious American-led project of democratization faltered. Several competing explanations have been advanced to explain this failure. David Edelstein, Chair of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, claims that military occupations succeed only if they occur in a "threat environment" in which the security, survival, and integrity of an occupied territory is menaced. The case of Afghanistan exemplifies the challenges associated with attempting to democratize a reluctant population by force.