Do Statistics Reinforce Administrative Centralisation? The Contradictory Influence of Quantified Indicators on French National Police

Abstract

The introduction of new public management methods, combined with the growing use of new technologies, has turned quantified indicators into a crucial element of policing in France. Beyond the political/politician use that can be made of such quantitative data, the issue of how they actually influence everyday policing practices and priorities as well as the organisation itself and the relationships within it is a source of concern and should be explored. The growing impact of statistics has resulted in an ever-increasing reliance on databases and reporting tools such as the Main Courante Informatisée (MCI, the digital police station logbook), the introduction of performance-based bonuses, and a reinforcement of the data management teams. Because reporting and circulating information upwards through all levels of management (from police stations to the ministry of Interior) was deemed necessary, the hierarchical management pyramid ended up being buttressed while the level of autonomy of ground officers dwindled. The latter are feeling pressured and frustrated by increasing demands for information and results from management. This has sparked a number of adjustment, avoidance, and even cheating strategies designed to provide figures that will meet the quantitative goals assigned by the upper echelon of management, more often than not suspected of being interested in statistics only, instead of how adequately “real” policing is being implemented. In this respect, centralising effects can be said to be counterbalanced by centrifugal practices.