This paper describes a new type of attack on tamper-resistant cryptographic hardware. We show that by locally observing the value of a few RAM or adress bus bits (possibly a single one) during the execution of a cryptographic algorithm, typically by the mean of a probe (needle), an attacker could easily recover information on the secret key being used; our attacks apply to public-key cryptosystems such as RSA or El Gamal, as well as to secret-key encryption schemes including DES and RC5.
CITATION STYLE
Handschuh, H., Paillier, P., & Stern, J. (1999). Probing attacks on tamper-resistant devices. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 1717, pp. 303–315). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48059-5_26
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