The Case for a Limited Use of Dignity as a Legal Principle

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Abstract

This international study reveals that, although it is not legally recognized by all countries, the concept of dignity attracts universal interest. Nevertheless, in those states which do recognize dignity, it is a tool which can be used not only for strengthening and increasing rights and freedoms but also for restricting them. This in-depth examination of these different uses of dignity thereby supports a limited use of the concept in law. Although express reference to dignity in fundamental texts may be legitimate insofar as it recognizes the rights of every person, it should not be used to limit other rights and most importantly, it should not obscure the major issue of the scope of rights and freedoms and their limits.

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Feuillet-Liger, B. (2018). The Case for a Limited Use of Dignity as a Legal Principle. In Ius Gentium (Vol. 71, pp. 289–318). Springer Science and Business Media B.V. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99112-2_22

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