Book review: Minds, Brains and Law: The Conceptual Foundations of Law and Neuroscience

Abstract

Corporations or firms with significant practices dedicated to patents and antitrust law should consider adding this book to their collections. Likewise, academic libraries serving faculty with strong interests in the topics (especially faculty keen on empirical studies) would benefit from adding the book to their collections; it could even make a solid textbook for a seminar. The book will be most appealing to specialists, which makes it less attractive for collections not serving specialists if space or funds are a concern. Pardo, Michael S., and Dennis Patterson. Minds, Brains, and Law: The Conceptual Foundations of Law and Neuroscience. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. 240p. $85. Reviewed by Karen Breda* 61 With the emergence of neurolaw, neuroethics, and neuroeconomics, there has been an explosion of scholarly and popular interest in how neuroscience affects our understanding of human decision making, free will and determinism, and the corresponding impact on legal and moral theory. In their timely book, Minds, Brains, and Law: The Conceptual Foundations of Law and Neuroscience, Michael S. Pardo and Dennis Patterson explore the relationship between the mind, the brain, and jurisprudence from a conceptual standpoint. They go on to critically rethink legal arguments in favor of applying neuroscience to evidence, criminal law, and theories of punishment. 62 After a brief introduction, Minds, Brains, and Law presents three chapters that discuss the philosophical issues to be considered and the methodological framework applied throughout the book; three concepts of the mind: Cartesian Dualism, the neuro-reductionist conception, and the Aristotelian conception; and the current scholarship concerning ways in which neuroscience can transform jurisprudence and moral judgment. 63 The authors explain that logical conceptions of the mind, consciousness, knowledge, and memory are necessary before neuroscience can inform legal theory. The classic concept is that the mind is immaterial (or spiritual or supernatural, if you will) and is in causal interaction with the body. This concept, articulated by René Descartes, is known as Cartesian Dualism. This classical concept has been largely rejected by contemporary neuroscientists and neurolegalists as implausible. The neuro-reductionist concept that the mind is the brain is the conceptualization favored by contemporary scientists and legal scholars. However, the authors point out that neuro-reductionism is hampered by the fallacy of confusing the part for the whole. The authors argue that there is more behind a person's being and behav-ior than just the brain and its neural activity—that culture, individual experience, and a plethora of other factors work together with the brain to make up a person's mind and consciousness. The authors advocate an Aristotelian concept that the mind is an array of emotional and rational abilities manifested in thought, feeling, and action. * © Karen Breda, 2014. Legal Information Librarian and Lecturer in Law, Boston College Law