The AU, RECs, and the Politics of Security Regionalism in Africa

Abstract

Principal-Agent theory assumes a purposeful relationship between a Principal and an Agent, in which the former acts through the latter in pursuit of clearly defined interests. Responsibility for outcomes of action lies not with the Agent but the Principal. Viewing security governance in Africa using this lens, the AU is uniquely at once a governance Agent for member-States but also a Principal in relation to both RECs performing devolved security functions and Regional Brigades as devolved structures of the ASF. Drawing upon the parallel existence of both kinds of organisation in Eastern Africa-where two RECs, IGAD and the EAC, and a Regional Brigade, the EASF, interlink-this chapter underlines the challenge facing the AU’s efforts in security regionalism. It shows that AU-level decisions on regionalisation of the ASF in Eastern Africa were not aligned with pre-existing RECs. From a Principal-Agent perspective, IGAD, the EAC and EASF are too disjointed to act as Agents on behalf of the Principal, the AU. This engenders organisational overlaps and difficulties of assessing performance and responsibility for sub-regional security governance, thereby raising important theoretical, methodological, and practical questions on the “Africa Rising” premise.