Abstract
We study a problem of a defender who wants to protect a network against contagious attack by an intelligent adversary. The defender could only protect a fixed number of nodes and does not know the network. Each of the nodes in the network does not know the network either, but knows his/her neighbours only. We propose an incentive compatible mechanism allowing the defender to elicit information about the whole network. The mechanism is efficient in the sense that under truthful reports it assigns the protection optimally.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Dziubiński, M., Sankowski, P., & Zhang, Q. (2016). Network elicitation in adversarial environment. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 9996 LNCS, pp. 397–414). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47413-7_23
Register to see more suggestions
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.
