The neural antecedents to voluntary action: A conceptual analysis

Abstract

The inferential standards for testing hypotheses are settled; those for constructing them rarely even discussed. If the fit to the data of a hypothesis matters, then so must its fundamental coherence. That is indeed prior to any other question. Here we make use of conceptual analysis in testing the coherence of hypotheses in cognitive neuroscience and apply it to the study of the antecedents to voluntary action. We show that many influential experiments in the literature are premised—often covertly—on erroneous conceptions that render their hypotheses incoherent. The inferences drawn from the data are therefore invalidated proximally to any objection empirical replication could counter. We further demonstrate the empirical consequences of these errors in generating artifactual observable effects that have no general significance and impede further progress. We conclude with a basic framework for constructing robust hypotheses in this difficult and important field.