International atomic energy agency safeguards under the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: Challenges in implementation

Abstract

The overall challenge currently facing the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA or Agency) is how most effectively and efficiently to provide soundly based safeguards conclusions in the face of an increasing workload and in light of recent discoveries of a range of undeclared nuclear activities in several States with comprehensive safeguards agreements. Since the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme in 1991, the IAEA safeguards system has been radically modified, especially to strengthen its ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities. Most significantly, additional protocols, based on the Model Additional Protocol (AP) to safeguards agreements approved in 1997, provide the legal authority necessary for the Agency to obtain more information than ever before about a State's nuclear activities and more access to nuclear fuel cycle-related sites and locations in the State. Fundamental to strengthened safeguards is a shift in focus from drawing safeguards conclusions based on safeguards implementation at the facility level to drawing conclusions based on implementation and evaluation of information for the State as a whole. This marked change of emphasis gives rise to new techniques and technology, to many new sources of information and to new methods of work. Outmoded database systems, major new nuclear facilities expected to come on line and under safeguards, current and future equipment needs, and pending mass retirements of experienced safeguards inspectors further strain the system. IAEA Member States have finally acknowledged the critical resource situation and have agreed to a budgetary increase for safeguards following more than 15 years of zero growth. The task now is to optimise the use of these resources to strengthen further the effectiveness and increase the efficiency of safeguards implementation. In the near to mid-term, a fundamental related challenge is to widen adherence to additional protocols in order to maximise the potential of the strengthened safeguards system. This paper focuses on that system and on the operational and technical challenges now confronting it. © 2006 Springer Berlin · Heidelberg.