What is acquaintance with consciousness?

Abstract

It is a plausible thought that we are acquainted with our own phenomenal states, and that there are special canonical concepts of those states − phenomenal concepts − that in some sense or another facilitate this acquaintance. Let Acquaintance be the claim that our most general concept of phenomenal consciousness − the concept consciousness − is such a canonical concept, facilitating acquaintance with the property of being phenomenally conscious. In “Orthodox Property Dualism + The Linguistic Theory of Vagueness = Panpsychism”, Phillip Goff attempts to put a version of Acquaintance to work. He first argues that Orthodox Property Dualists − those who accept Property Dualism on the basis of arguments from epistemic gaps to ontological gaps − are committed to his version of Acquaintance, which he dubs Phenomenal Transparency. He then argues that Phenomenal Transparency implies that consciousness is not a vague concept, and finally he argues that this means Orthodox Property Dualists should be Panpsychists.