Length based attack and braid groups: Cryptanalysis of Anshel-Anshel- Goldfeld key exchange protocol

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Abstract

The length based attack on Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld commutator key-exchange protocol [1] was initially proposed by Hughes and Tannenbaum in [9]. Several attempts have been made to implement the attack [6], but none of them had produced results convincing enough to believe that attack works. In this paper we show that accurately designed length based attack can successfully break a random instance of the simultaneous conjugacy search problem for certain parameter values and argue that the public/private information chosen uniformly random leads to weak keys. © International Association for Cryptologic Research 2007.

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Myasnikov, A. D., & Ushakov, A. (2007). Length based attack and braid groups: Cryptanalysis of Anshel-Anshel- Goldfeld key exchange protocol. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4450 LNCS, pp. 76–88). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71677-8_6

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