Judicial Independence and Accountability in the British Constitution

Abstract

The principal objective of this chapter is to describe the present state of judicial independence and accountability in the British Constitution. The chapter also takes, however, a critical view of Britain's constitutional arrangements for securing judicial independence and accountability, drawing on recent controversies to demonstrate the potential frailty of these arrangements. Underlying the description is a broader message, that Britain's constitutional arrangements are best understood as a series of pragmatic responses to such challenges as happen to arise from time to time. Given the nature of Britain's uncodified constitution, which is neither supreme nor entrenched, the norms that exist in and constitute the British Constitution do not lie, ultimately, in the hands of the judiciary. Significant constitutional change can happen very quickly -- as with the transformation of the office of Lord Chancellor. There is reason to fear, therefore, that the protection of norms (including those of judicial independence and accountability) will be less robust than in jurisdictions with a codified, entrenched, supreme constitutional document.