We address the problem of computing the information leakage of a system in an efficient way. We propose two methods: one based on reducing the problem to reachability, and the other based on techniques from quantitative counterexample generation. The second approach can be used either for exact or approximate computation, and provides feedback for debugging. These methods can be applied also in the case in which the input distribution is unknown. We then consider the interactive case and we point out that the definition of associated channel proposed in literature is not sound. We show however that the leakage can still be defined consistently, and that our methods extend smoothly. © 2010 Springer-Verlag.
CITATION STYLE
Andrés, M. E., Palamidessi, C., Van Rossum, P., & Smith, G. (2010). Computing the leakage of information-hiding systems. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 6015 LNCS, pp. 373–389). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12002-2_32
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