Preimage attacks on Full-ARIRANG: Analysis of DM-mode with middle feed-forward

4Citations
Citations of this article
19Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
Get full text

Abstract

In this paper, we present preimage attacks on hash function ARIRANG, which is one of the first round candidates in the SHA-3 competition. Although ARIRANG was not chosen for the second round, the vulnerability as a hash function has not been discovered yet. ARIRANG has an unique design where the feed-forward operation is computed not only after the last step but also in a middle step. In fact, this design prevents previous preimage attacks from breaking full steps. In this paper, we apply a framework of meet-in-the-middle preimage attacks to ARIRANG. Specifically, we propose a new initial-structure technique optimized for ARIRANG that overcomes the use of the feed-forward to the middle. This enables us to find preimages of full steps ARIRANG-256 and ARIRANG-512 with 2 254 and 2 505 compression function operations and 2 6 and 2 16 amount of memory, respectively. These are the first results breaking the security of ARIRANG as a hash function. © 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Ohtahara, C., Okada, K., Sasaki, Y., & Shimoyama, T. (2012). Preimage attacks on Full-ARIRANG: Analysis of DM-mode with middle feed-forward. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 7115 LNCS, pp. 40–54). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27890-7_4

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free