Anonymous, Yet Trustworthy Auctions

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Abstract

An auction is an inevitable market mechanism to setup prices of goods or services in a competitive and dynamic environment. Anonymity of bidders is required to conceal their business strategies from competitors. However, it is also essential to provide the seller guarantees that a bidder is trustworthy and competent enough to perform certain tasks (e.g transports). This paper proposes an auction protocol where bidders will participate anonymously, yet prove to be trustworthy and competent and can be held accountable towards auctioneers and sellers. Moreover, the protocol introduces promises, bonuses and compensations to ensure the best price for the sellers, extra profit for bidders and opportunities for newcomers in the business. It also handles ties, and copes with last minute bidding. Finally, the auction's fair proceedings and outcome can be verified by everyone. © IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2009.

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APA

Chanda, P. B., Naessens, V., & De Decker, B. (2009). Anonymous, Yet Trustworthy Auctions. In IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology (Vol. 305, pp. 225–239). Springer New York LLC. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04280-5_19

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