Post-quantum security of Fiat-Shamir

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Abstract

The Fiat-Shamir construction (Crypto 1986) is an efficient transformation in the random oracle model for creating non-interactive proof systems and signatures from sigma-protocols. In classical cryptography, Fiat-Shamir is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge assuming that the underlying sigma-protocol has the zero-knowledge and special soundness properties. Unfortunately, Ambainis, Rosmanis, and Unruh (FOCS 2014) ruled out non-relativizing proofs under those conditions in the quantum setting. In this paper, we show under which strengthened conditions the Fiat-Shamir proof system is still post-quantum secure. Namely, we show that if we require the sigma-protocol to have computational zero-knowledge and statistical soundness, then Fiat-Shamir is a zero-knowledge simulation-sound proof system (but not a proof of knowledge!). Furthermore, we show that Fiat-Shamir leads to a post-quantum secure unforgeable signature scheme when additionally assuming a “dual-mode hard instance generator” for generating key pairs.

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APA

Unruh, D. (2017). Post-quantum security of Fiat-Shamir. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 10624 LNCS, pp. 65–95). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70694-8_3

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