The resilience of laws and the ephemerality of objects: Can a form of structuralism be extended to biology?

Abstract

Broadly defined, structuralism urges us to shift our claims of ontological priority, from objects to structures.2 Historically it is a view that arose out of reflection on the nature of modern (that is, twentieth century) physics and in its most recent incarnations it is motivated by a) the attempt to capture what remains the same through radical theory change3 and b) the implications of quantum theory for our conception of physical objects.4 As broadly defined, it encompasses diverse understandings of the nature of structure and the relationship between structure and putative objects.5 The question I wish to consider is whether this ontological shift can be extended into the biological domain. I’d like to thank Marcel Weber for inviting me to give the presentation on which this paper is based and the audience of the ESF-PSE workshop “Points of Contact between the Philosophy of Physics and the Philosophy of Biology” in London, December 2010, for the excellent questions and general discussion. I’d also like to acknowledge the many helpful contributions from Angelo Cei, Kerry McKenzie and especially Alirio Rosales on various aspects of this attempt to extend structuralism.