We present the first fault attack on cryptosystems based on supersingular isogenies. During the computation of the auxiliary points, the attack aims to change the base point to a random point on the curve via a fault injection. We will show that this would reveal the secret isogeny with one successful perturbation with high probability. We will exhibit the attack by placing it against signature schemes and key-exchange protocols with validations in place. Our paper therefore demonstrates the need to incorporate checks in implementations of the cryptosystem.
CITATION STYLE
Ti, Y. B. (2017). Fault attack on supersingular isogeny cryptosystems. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 10346 LNCS, pp. 107–122). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59879-6_7
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