Will Corporate Tax Avoidance Lead to Forced Executives Turnover?

Abstract

Based on the data of A-share listed companies in 2004-2018, this paper discusses the possible economic consequences of corporate tax avoidance from the individual level of executives. In this paper, the degree of corporate tax avoidance is divided into aggressive tax avoidance behavior and passive tax avoidance behavior, respectively, to study the impact of different degrees of tax avoidance on executives forced to be replaced by listed companies. It is found that both aggressive tax avoidance and passive tax avoidance will lead to forced executives turnover. In addition, this paper also examines the moderation effects of the nature of property rights, the performance of corporate social responsibility and market concentration on the above-mentioned research, and finds that private companies, companies that perform social responsibility well and companies in areas with fierce market competition, the passive tax avoidance behavior has a greater impact on executives forced turnover.