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From Tarski to Gödel-or how to derive the second incompleteness theorem from the undefinability of truth without self-reference

Journal of Logic and Computation (2019) 29(5) 595-604
DOI: 10.1093/logcom/exz004
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Abstract

In this paper, we provide a fairly general self-reference-free proof of the second incompleteness theorem from Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of truth.

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Visser, A. (2019). From Tarski to Gödel-or how to derive the second incompleteness theorem from the undefinability of truth without self-reference. Journal of Logic and Computation, 29(5), 595–604. https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exz004

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