Levinas: Philosophy of the Other

Abstract

Emmanuel Levinas (1906–95), Martin Buber (1878–1965) and Gabriel Marcel (1889–1973) opposed the disengagement of the individual as described in Chapter 3. They argued for a self that is oriented towards the other. For all three the relation between self and other precedes and transcends the identity of the self. In that sense ethics is primary philosophy, if ethics is seen as oriented towards the relation between self and other. For Buber (2006) the relation with the other is a matter of dialogue in reciprocity and symmetry, in give and take and in a convergence of self and other. That suggests an idyllic end station in which difference and power no longer play a role. Levinas denies that. He is extremely radical. According to him the relation between self and other remains asymmetrical: the self remains more responsible for the other than vice versa, the self surrenders itself without calculation and without demanding or even expecting anything in return. Self and other can never merge, be subsumed in each other, become equal or even comparable. Especially on the last point I agree and therefore I prefer to proceed with Levinas rather than Buber.