The epistemology of self-locating belief concerns itself with how rational agents ought to respond to certain kinds of indexical information. I argue that those who endorse the thesis of Time-Slice Rationality ought to endorse a particular view about the epistemology of self-locating belief, according to which ‘essentially indexical’ information is never evidentially relevant to non-indexical matters. I close by offering some independent motivations for endorsing Time-Slice Rationality in the context of the epistemology of self-locating belief.
CITATION STYLE
Builes, D. (2020). Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief. Philosophical Studies, 177(10), 3033–3049. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01358-1
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