Abstract
We study the behaviour of rational agents in exchange protocols which rely on trustees. We allow malicious parties to compromise the trustee by paying a cost and, thereby, present a game analysis that advocates exchange protocols which induce balanced risks on the participants. We also present a risk-balanced protocol for fair confidential secret comparison. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Dashti, M. T., & Wang, Y. (2007). Risk balance in exchange protocols. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4846 LNCS, pp. 70–77). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76929-3_8
Register to see more suggestions
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.
