In this paper, we formally verify security properties of the ARMv7 Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) for user mode executions. To obtain guarantees that arbitrary (and unknown) user processes are able to run isolated from privileged software and other user processes, instruction level noninterference and integrity properties are provided, along with proofs that transitions to privileged modes can only occur in a controlled manner. This work establishes a main requirement for operating system and hypervisor verification, as demonstrated for the PROSPER separation kernel. The proof is performed in the HOL4 theorem prover, taking the Cambridge model of ARM as basis. To this end, a proof tool has been developed, which assists the verification of relational state predicates semi-automatically. © Springer International Publishing 2013.
CITATION STYLE
Khakpour, N., Schwarz, O., & Dam, M. (2013). Machine assisted proof of ARMv7 instruction level isolation properties. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 8307 LNCS, pp. 276–291). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03545-1_18
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