This chapter surveys the range of objectives ascribed to US antitrust policy from its formative period through the early 1970s. Martin discusses and rejects Robert Bork’s analysis of the legislative intent behind the Sherman Act and considers the Kaldor-Hicks potential Pareto improvement principle, a central element of Bork’s argument. An elementary model shows that social preferences about aspects of market performance not captured by consumer surplus or net social welfare can be included in standard economic models. He further argues that the role of economics as a science in analyzing market performance is limited to characterizing the costs and benefits of pursuing alternative policy objectives and that economics as a science is agnostic concerning what policy goals should be.
CITATION STYLE
Martin, S. (2018). Dispersion of Power as an Economic Goal of Antitrust Policy. In Palgrave Studies in the History of Economic Thought (pp. 251–290). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94039-7_10
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