The chapter contributes to the debate about arguments by analogy, especially the distinction between ‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’ analogies and the question how such arguments can be ‘deductive’, yet nonetheless defeasible. It claims that ‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’ are structural, not normative categories, and should not be used to designate argument validity. Based on Aristotle’s analysis of enthymemes, examples, and metaphors, it argues that arguments from analogy are complex arguments that involve inductive, abductive, and deductive components.
CITATION STYLE
Kraus, M. (2015). Arguments by Analogy (and What We Can Learn about Them from Aristotle). In Argumentation Library (Vol. 28, pp. 171–182). Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21103-9_13
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