Auditable Attribute-Based Credentials Scheme and Its Application in Contact Tracing

Abstract

During the pandemic, the limited functionality of existing privacy-preserving contact tracing systems highlights the need for new designs. Wang et al. proposed an environmental-adaptive framework (CSS ’21) but failed to formalize the security. The similarity between their framework and attribute-based credentials (ABC) inspires us to reconsider contact tracing from the perspective of ABC schemes. In such schemes, users can obtain credentials on attributes from issuers and prove the credentials anonymously (i.e., hiding sensitive information of both user and issuer). This work first extends ABC schemes with auditability, which enables designated auditing authorities to revoke the anonymity of particular issuers. For this purpose, we propose an “auditable public key (APK)” mechanism that extends the updatable public key by Fauzi et al. (AsiaCrypt ’19). We provide formal security definitions regarding auditability and build our auditable ABC scheme by adding a DDH-based APK to Connolly et al.’s ABC construction (PKC ’22). Note that the APK mechanism can be used as a plug-in for other cryptographic primitives and may be of independent interest. Finally, regarding contact tracing, we refine Wang et al.’s framework and present a formal treatment that includes security definitions and protocol construction. An implementation is provided to showcase the practicality of our design.