A network coordinate system assigns Euclidean "virtual" coordinates to every node in a network to allow easy estimation of network latency between pairs of nodes that have never contacted each other. These systems have been implemented in a variety of applications, most notably the popular Azureus/Vuze BitTorrent client. Zage and Nita-Rotaru (CCS 2007) and independently, Kaafar et al. (SIGCOMM 2007), demonstrated that several widely-cited network coordinate systems are prone to simple attacks, and proposed mechanisms to defeat these attacks using outlier detection to filter out adversarial inputs. We propose a new attack, Frog-Boiling, that defeats anomaly-detection based defenses in the context of network coordinate systems, and demonstrate empirically that Frog-Boiling is more disruptive than the previously known attacks. Our results suggest that a new approach is needed to solve this problem: outlier detection alone cannot be used to secure network coordinate systems.© Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2010.
CITATION STYLE
Chan-Tin, E., Feldman, D., Hopper, N., & Kim, Y. (2009). The Frog-Boiling attack: Limitations of anomaly detection for secure network coordinate systems. In Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering (Vol. 19 LNICST, pp. 448–458). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-05284-2_26
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