Collision attacks against the Knudsen-Preneel compression functions

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Abstract

Knudsen and Preneel (Asiacrypt'96 and Crypto'97) introduced a hash function design in which a linear error-correcting code is used to build a wide-pipe compression function from underlying blockciphers operating in Davies-Meyer mode. Their main design goal was to deliver compression functions with collision resistance up to, and even beyond, the block size of the underlying blockciphers. In this paper, we present new collision-finding attacks against these compression functions using the ideas of an unpublished work of Watanabe and the preimage attack of Özen, Shrimpton, and Stam (FSE'10). In brief, our best attack has a time complexity strictly smaller than the block-size for all but two of the parameter sets. Consequently, the time complexity lower bound proven by Knudsen and Preneel is incorrect and the compression functions do not achieve the security level they were designed for. © 2010 International Association for Cryptologic Research.

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APA

Özen, O., & Stam, M. (2010). Collision attacks against the Knudsen-Preneel compression functions. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 6477 LNCS, pp. 76–93). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17373-8_5

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