This paper studies the interplay of network connectivity and perfectly secure message transmission under the corrupting influence of a Byzantine mobile adversary that may move from player to player but can corrupt no more than t players at any given time. It is known that, in the stationary adversary model where the adversary corrupts the same set of t players throughout the protocol, perfectly secure communication among any pair of players is possible if and only if the underlying synchronous network is (2t + 1)-connected. Surprisingly, we show that (2t + 1)-connectivity is sufficient (and of course, necessary) even in the proactive (mobile) setting where the adversary is allowed to corrupt different sets of t players in different rounds of the protocol. In other words, adversarial mobility has no effect on the possibility of secure communication. Towards this, we use the notion of a Communication Graph, which is useful in modelling scenarios with adversarial mobility. We also show that protocols for reliable and secure communication proposed in [15] can be modified to tolerate the mobile adversary, Further these protocols are round-optimal if the underlying network is a collection of disjoint paths from the sender S to receiver R. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007.
CITATION STYLE
Srinathan, K., Raghavendra, P., & Chandrasekaran, P. R. (2007). On proactive perfectly secure message transmission. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4586 LNCS, pp. 461–473). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73458-1_33
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