The Nature and Purpose of Aristotelian Dialectic Revisited: Argumentation Theory, Scientific Controversies and Epistemology

Abstract

Aristotelian dialectic has inspired important developments in contemporary argumentation theory, the rhetoric of science and the theory of controversies. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate these developments with respect to both Aristotle’s own approach—enriched as it might be by crucial historical developments—, and to the epistemic significance of dialectical reasoning. In the first part of the paper, I will analyze the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric, two sister disciplines dealing specifically with effective discourse. In the second part, I will look more particularly at the meaning of ‘endoxa’, the premises of dialectical reasoning, and I will occasionally refer to important developments in the tradition of dialectic. Given this background, in the third part I will show how contemporary developments take different forms which correspond to two separate trends. The first trend emphasizes rhetorical persuasion and sees dialectic as a particular kind of discourse whose ultimate goal is to create a consensus about a controversial claim. The second trend, which better corresponds to Aristotle’s own approach, sees dialogue and disputation as the distinctive feature of dialectic. In the last section, I will highlight the specific contribution that dialectic can make to the advancement of knowledge: dialectic allows one of the two interlocutors in a disputation to shift the burden of proof and acquire a presumption of truth in his favor by forcing an adversary to concede to objectively acceptable premises. James Freeman, more than either Frans van Eemeren & Rob Grootendorst and Douglas Walton, maintains a position similar to Aristotle’s. Claims to knowledge are thus tested in a fallible, albeit not contextually-dependent, way. In a slightly more skeptical approach, claims are “balanced” one against the other: the theory of controversies, at least in Marcelo Dascal’s approach, can also be seen as corresponding to Cicero’s interpretation of the Aristotelian legacy of dialectic.