Nihilism: Heidegger/Jünger/Aristotle

Abstract

The essay challenges settled readings of nihilism via a Heideggerian reflection on phusis and techne. It makes the following points: (1) the withdrawal intrinsic to Ereignis is for the sake of the accessibility of entities; (2) historical nihilism does not result from a factual abundance of techne and dearth of phusis; (3) nihilism is not proportionate to the degree of understanding of and control over entities; (4) the essence of nihilism does not reside in its historical fulfillment in an age of technology, but belongs instead to the essence of being-itself; (5) Ereignis entails that everything is comprehensible except the comprehensibility of everything. This is to confirm the finitude both of human being and of all forms of beingness precisely by generating an infinity of possibilities for the reshaping of the world; (6) our engagement with nihilism must shift from the �what� to the �how,� from discourse about the essence of nihilism to decisions about how best to carry out its infinite tasks.