Abstract
We present a chosen-ciphertext attack against both NICE cryptosystems. These two cryptosystems are based on computations in the class group of non-maximal imaginary orders. More precisely, the systems make use of the canonical surjection between the class group of the quadratic order of discriminant (Equation Presented) and the class group of the quadratic order of discriminant (Equation Presented). In this paper, we examine the properties of this canonical surjection and use them to build a chosenciphertext attack that recovers the secret key (p and q) from two ciphertexts/cleartexts pairs. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Jaulmes, É., & Joux, A. (2000). A NICE cryptanalysis. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 1807, 382–391. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45539-6_26
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