Coalition Formation

Abstract

As opposed to the literature on representative democracy, hardly any attention is paid to the process of coalition formation in the context of direct democracy. To my knowledge, Manweller (2005), Bowler & Hanneman (2006) and Kriesi (2005, 2006) are the only studies which explicitly address this issue. Given the importance of coalitions in direct-democratic campaigns, more needs to be known about this phenomenon. In this chapter, I will take a closer look at the internal structure of the two opposing camps. I shall argue that in these campaigns, the conditions for coalition formation are quite different from those found in representative democracy. There is little room for bargaining, there are no designated leaders, and the number and the type of potential coalition partners are both large. In contrast to the context of representative democracy, political actors face a strong incentive to attract a maximum number of allies. The rationale behind this assumption relates to the fact that the final decision is delegated to citizens in direct-democratic votes. As the political elites do not control the outcome, forming encompassing coalitions constitutes an effective means by which to enhance the chances of success at the polls. Broad and heterogeneous coalitions are not easy to manage, however. While the binary logic of direct-democratic votes imposes the formation of two camps, the various organizations involved within a given camp might wish to adopt substantively distinct campaign strategies.