Cryptanalysis mainly has public algorithms as target; however cryptanalytic effort has also been directed quite successfully to block ciphers that contain secret components, typically S-boxes. Known approaches can only attack reduced-round variants of the target algorithms, AES being a nice example. In this paper we present a novel cryptanalytic attack that can recover the specification of S-boxes from algorithms that resist to cryptanalysis, under the assumption that the attacker can work on a pair of such block ciphers that instantiate related S-boxes. These S-boxes satisfy the designer's requirements but are weakly diversified; the relationship between these unknown components is used in much the same way as relationship between secret keys is used in related-key attacks. This attack (called related S-box attack) can be used, under certain assumptions, to retrieve the content of the S-boxes in practical time. We apply our attack to two well known ciphers, AES and Camellia; these ciphers use 8-bit S-boxes but are structurally very different, and our attack adapts accordingly. This shows that most probably the same can be applied to other ciphers which can be customized to instantiate unknown 8-bit S-boxes. © 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
CITATION STYLE
Macchetti, M. (2013). Cryptanalysis of AES and camellia with related S-boxes. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 7918 LNCS, pp. 208–221). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38553-7_12
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