Many irreconcilable accounts of ratio legis in legal science, often concerned with legal interpretation, suffer from being disconnected from practical reasoning. Different theories of legal interpretation which result in one-sided views of ratio legis are by-products of one-sided semantics. The first part of the chapter diagnoses this problem by providing a model of three types of one-sided semantics- upstream, midstream and downstream-and explaining how they translate into respective accounts of legal interpretation and ratio legis. The second part of the chapter presents an alternative to one-sided semantics in legal theory. The alternative account which combines semantics and practical reasoning in legal theory is based on Brandom's inferential pragmatism. The usefulness of inferential pragmatism in legal theory with regard to the problem of ratio legis is tested and followed by extending an inferentialist account of ratio legis provided by Canale and Tuzet. A model of agent's actions and reasons, and their impact on the reasoning of interpreters and decision-makers is the essential part of this extension.
CITATION STYLE
Dybowski, M. (2018). Articulating Ratio Legis and practical reasoning. In Ratio Legis: Philosophical and Theoretical Perspectives (pp. 29–55). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74271-7_3
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