Abstract
We analyze the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) protocol for authenticated key agreement, recently proposed by the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) for the deployment in machine readable travel documents. We show that the PACE protocol is secure in the real-or-random sense of Abdalla, Fouque and Pointcheval, under a number-theoretic assumption related to the Diffie-Hellman problem and assuming random oracles and ideal ciphers. © 2009 Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
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CITATION STYLE
Bender, J., Fischlin, M., & Kügler, D. (2009). Security analysis of the PACE key-agreement protocol. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5735 LNCS, pp. 33–48). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04474-8_3
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