Abstract
In this paper we study the notion of the Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) in evolutionary games and we demonstrate their qualitative difference from the Nash Equilibria, by showing that a random evolutionary game has on average exponentially less number of ESS than the number of Nash Equilibria in the underlying symmetric 2-person game with random payoffs. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Kontogiannis, S., & Spirakis, P. (2005). Counting stable strategies in random evolutionary games. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 3827 LNCS, pp. 839–848). https://doi.org/10.1007/11602613_84
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