Research on Quantum-Attack-Resistant Strong Forward-Secure Signature Schemes

1Citations
Citations of this article
8Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

Abstract

The security of digital signatures depends significantly on the signature key. Therefore, to reduce the impact of leaked keys upon existing signatures and subsequent ones, a digital signature scheme with strong forward security could be an effective solution. Most existing strong forward-secure digital signature schemes rely on traditional cryptosystems, which cannot effectively resist quantum attacks. By introducing lattice-based delegation technology into the key-iteration process, a two-direction and lattice-based key-iteration algorithm with strong forward security is proposed. In the proposed algorithm, a unique key pair is assigned to the signer in every period. Based on the proposed algorithm, a strong forward-secure signature scheme is further put forward, which achieves resistance to quantum attacks. Performance analysis shows that under the security assumption of the SIS problem on the lattice, the proposed strong forward-secure signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under the random oracle model. Ultimately, based on the proposed strong forward-secure signature scheme, a remote identity-authentication scheme that is resistant to quantum attacks is proposed, ensuring post-quantum security in the user-authentication process.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Li, F., Wang, J., Shang, M., Zhang, D., & Li, T. (2023). Research on Quantum-Attack-Resistant Strong Forward-Secure Signature Schemes. Entropy, 25(8). https://doi.org/10.3390/e25081159

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free